

Docker & Security

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#whoweare



- Founding members of the CTF team squareroots
- Long-time infosec/IT nerds
- Florian: CTO @stocard.de
- Matthias: CEO @ERNW Research

Agenda

- Basics & Tech Stack
- Security Aspects
- (Potential) Benefits?
- Architectural Implications
- Hands-on
- Challenges
- Dev/Deployment Lifecycle meets Security



What is Docker?



- Linux-based container solution
- Used to use LXC
- LXC = Legacy API for cgroups and namespaces
 - New development linuxcontainer
- cgroups: resource prioritization/limitation of
 - CPU
 - Memory
 - Network interfaces
- Namespaces: Isolation of system view as for
 - User IDs
 - Processes
 - Network interfaces
- Layered filesystem
- Shared Kernel!



Demo

Docker & Security?

– Security Objectives:

- Isolation
- Governance
 - I.e. no abuse of Docker to subvert security mechanisms, such as
 - patch management
 - software from trusted sources
 - segregation of test/prod

Virtualisierung im Vergleich

	Physikalischer Host	Virtuelle Maschine	Container
Gemeinsame Ressourcen	Teilen sich das Netz	Teilen sich die Host-Hardware	Teilen sich den Kernel
Angriffsszenario	Angriff per Netz auf offene Ports etc.	Angriff auf Hypervisor	Angriff per Syscall auf Kernel-Isolation (Namespaces, Cgroups, ...)
Schutzmaßnahmen	Portfilter, Firewalls, Segmentierung der Netze	Guter Hypervisor	Absicherung im Containermanager, SE-Linux, Capabilities
Aufwand der Maßnahmen	Einfach, Best Practices	Komplex, aber zentral zu managen	Vielschichtig durch relativ große Angriffsfläche

Quelle:

<https://www.inovex.de/fileadmin/files/Vortraege/2015/docker-security-nils-magnus-guug-26.03.2015.pdf>

LXC

- Current version (Mar 2016): 1.10.0
- Before 1.0 (Feb 2014):
 - Containers could not be run as non-root users
 - Implicit possibility for container-root-user to break out of the container via sysfs
 - No user namespaces

User namespaces

- Before user namespaces:
 - UID 0 in container was uid 0 in host
 - UID 1000 in container was uid 1000 in host
 - => 1:1 mapping
- With user namespaces:
 - UIDs in container can be mapped to UID range on host
 - Root in container != root on host!



Demo

Breakout Vectors

– Kernel Vulnerabilities

- Shared kernel between container and host => Kernel vulnerability violates isolation
- Attack surface: syscall interface
 - More than 600 syscalls...



Docker Attack Surface

- Governance: SW from trusted sources
 - Docker images from *docker pull*
- Docker as an vulnerable application:
 - Privilege escalation on the host
 - Remote code execution on the host

Known Attacks & Vulnerability History

Breakout

- Before 1.0: Breakout by design via sysfs
 - http://blog.bofh.it/debian/id_413
- “Containers do not contain”
 - <http://opensource.com/business/14/7/docker-security-selinux>
 - Devices are not namespaced:
 - `/dev/mem`
 - `/dev/sd*` file system devices
 - Kernel Modules
 - If you can communicate or attack one of these as a privileged process, you can own the system.



Breakout

- “Shocker”, Using capabilities:
 - CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH and CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
 - Allow to open files not only by pathname (which would be restricted to container layered filesystem), but also inodes
 - Iterate through inode numbers (/ is starting at 2) to access any file on the host.



On the host

– Privilege escalation:

- <http://reventlov.com/advisories/using-the-docker-command-to-root-the-host>
- Docker socket was world-accessible (rw)
- Create root-container with host-fs mounted


On the host

– Remote code execution

- Symlink attacks via downloaded docker bundles that are extracted

Counter Measures & Hardening

The Basics...



- Docker is "IT + X".
- Don't ignore traditional controls such as
 - High patch level
 - Isolation of management interfaces
 - Least privilege
- The following slides only contain Docker specifics.
- CIS Benchmark most comprehensive source (see sources).

Linux Containers

... and Hardening

- User namespaces (see above) and non-root containers
- *seccomp*: Restrict available syscalls
- *cap-drop*: Drop capabilities for the container (such as to access files based on inodes)

Docker improvements

- Read-only sysfs/procfs
- Command line options for *cap-drop*

Hardening Options


Docker specifics

- Use SELinux enforcement (many distribution ship proper profiles)
- Use hardened host kernel (GRsec)
- Use non-privileged containers
- Use docker-bench-security to check for security best practices
 - <https://github.com/docker/docker-bench-security>

Benefits & Architecture



What is DevOps?



- Culture / Mindset
- Goal: improve quality and speed at which innovation is delivered
- Embrace
 - Communication
 - Collaboration
 - Integration of Development & Operations

Micro Services



- Architectural Pattern
- “Do One Thing and Do it Well!”
- Break apart monolithic apps into micro service clusters/clouds
- e.g. Amazon, Netflix, SoundCloud

Monolith Rant



- Obstacles to frequent deploys
 - Need to redeploy *everything*
 - Long running jobs (?)
 - Increased risk of failure
- Effects
 - Infrequent updates, long QA cycles
 - Slow iterations, inhibiting experimentation
 - Slows down development
 - Communication overhead
 - Locked into tech stack

Micro Service Tribute



– Benefits:

- Smaller, more understandable apps
- No dependency hell
- Reduced startup times
- Smaller & faster deploys
- Fine-grained scaling
- Fast & Reproducible tests
- No tech lock-in
- Fault isolation

... but beware



- Complexity cost
 - Deployment
 - Overhead
 - Monitoring
 - Implicit interfaces
 - Service discovery / routing
 - Shared state
- Need to build devops XP & skills

12 Factor App




- Codebase in VCS
- Dependencies explicit and isolated
- Configuration vs Code
- Backing Services
- Build, release, run
- Stateless, isolated processes
- Disposability
- Dev/Prod/* Parity
- Logs as event streams

Docker?




- Content agnostic
- Hardware agnostic
- Content isolation & interaction
- Automation
- Highly efficient
- Separation of duties

Docker Engine



- Core of docker platform
- Offers baseline services to create and operate container
- Plugin-friendly
 - Networking
 - Logging
 - Volumes
 - Event Stream

Anatomy of a dockerized app



- Dockerfile – describes one service
- Images – runtime environments
- Containers – instance of app
- Volumes – non-ephemeral data
- Networks – communication



Dockerfile


DEMO

Docker Registry



- Distribution of docker images
- CI / CD stores images in registry
- Docker Engines pull images and run them

Docker Compose




- Definition and running of multi-container applications
- yaml-based definition of your application, including:
 - Images, services, network, volumes, ...
- docker-compose up - app running!



Dockerfile


DEMO

Docker Machine



- Automatic provisioning
 - Provision host
 - Install docker engine
 - Setup secure communication
- Provisioning Drivers
 - virtualbox, bare metal, AWS, GCE, Digital Ocean, Azure, and many more

Docker Swarm




- Built-in clustering tool for docker
- Combines a pool of hosts into one virtual docker host
- Discovery Services (consul, etcd, ZooKeeper)
- Basic filtering and scheduling


Challenges



- CI/CD
- Configuration/Orchestration Management
- Service Routing
- Log Management & Monitoring


CI / CD – Concept





CI / CD

Instantiation



SecDevOps?



NoSQL Borat
@NoSQLBorat



 Follow

To make mistake is human. To automatically deploy mistake to all of servers is DevOps.

 Reply  Retweet  Favorite  More

What is SecDevOps?


- Movement to make security work “DevOps” as well.
 - Haven’t seen a good implementation yet.
- More interesting question:
 - How can we integrate “security” into the described CI/CD/DevOps approach?

Objectives

- Security of the deployed application
- Security of the docker host OS + container OS

Traditional Approach

If it only would be...



- Security concept at beginning of the project
- Security assessment before releases
- Final approval before go-live

Opportunities



- There is no such thing as “out-of-band-patch”.
 - Also not on the OS level!
- Integrate automatic assessment tools into the deployment process
 - Nothing new though
- As ITSec: Enable yourself to have a faster dialogue with the developers
 - Establish tools (e.g. issue tracker)
 - Vuln/risk rating metric – the simpler the better!
 - Business-reasonable risk recommendations



Conclusions



Questions?

There's never enough time...

THANK YOU...

...for yours!



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@uchi_mata



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Sources



- Docker Bench: Checking for best practices
 - <https://github.com/docker/docker-bench-security>
- Jérôme Petazzoni on Docker Security
 - E.g.: Containers, Docker, and Security: State of the Union
 - http://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/Containers,%20Docker,%20and%20Security_%20State%20of%20the%20Union.pdf
- <http://opensource.com/business/14/9/security-for-docker>
- <https://zeltser.com/security-risks-and-benefits-of-docker-application/>
- CIS Hardening Guide
 - https://benchmarks.cisecurity.org/tools2/docker/CIS_Docker_1.6_Benchmark_v1.0.0.pdf

Sources

- Spender, High Impact Capabilities
 - <https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=2522>
- <http://xebia.github.io/cd-with-docker/#/>
- <http://www.schibsted.pl/2015/06/how-we-used-docker-to-deploy-schibsted-pl/>
- <http://itrevolution.com/the-three-ways-principles-underpinning-devops/>

